Introduction
Roles of communities, groups, and networks in development are a central theme that development economists often address (Barrett, 2005) . Private transfers are one of the most direct forms of social interaction. Although economists have extensively studied private transfers exchanged among households within a network (see, for example, Cox and Fafchamps, 2008 for review), those exchanged directly with groups to which the household belongs -such as ritual gifts, communal work, and church donations -have received very limited attention. I argue that extant studies on across-household transfers are incomplete for two reasons. First, the latter group-based transfers can be much greater than the former network-based transfers, because significant contributions are made to groups for their provision of local public goods, such as social activities and village upkeep. Second, these two forms of transfers can be tightly linked with each other. In particular, group-based transfers may significantly influence network-based transfers through the social hierarchy: As members' social ranks (e.g., elite status) affect groupbased transfers, individual households may adjust network-based transfers in a way to counteract this hierarchy bias. This is because although group membership is often exogenously determined by kinship, heredity, and eligibility, household transfer networks are endogenously formed by individual households. This paper generates empirical evidence for these conjectures. In particular, the comparison of various groups and social ranks discussed shortly indicates that the adjustment to hierarchy depends on the physical and social connections of groups and networks. The paper echoes the work of Cox and Fafchamps (2008) , who call for broadening the study of determinants of private transfers beyond income, which has been a dominant focus of extant works that explore transfer motives and crowding-out; while they emphasize demographics, I focus on groups and hierarchy.
The empirical analysis exploits original household survey data I gathered in the following two major village subgroups in rural Fiji. First, in Fiji and other Pacific island states, kinship underlies gift exchange not only among households through networks, but also between each household and the kin group to which it belongs, for securing social status and showing commitment to the group (Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1967) . Indeed, following Malinowski's (1922) seminal work on gifts and reciprocity in Melanesia, most related anthropological studies have been conducted in the Pacific region (Hann, 2006) . Second, development agents are increasingly recognizing community groups -such as women's groups and school groups -as essential local partners for implementing community-based development projects (Heyer et al., 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; World Bank, 2002) . Bernard et al. (2008) assess the existence of village organizations, their performance, and members' participation in benefits in Senegal and Burkina Faso; Okten and Osili (2004) analyze household contributions to community organizations in Indonesia with a focus on ethnic diversity within the organizations; and Imai and Eklund (2008) examine the roles of women's community-based organizations in child health in Papua New Guinea. Christianity also underlies Fijian society, and church donations are quite significant. Religious networks may be as important as kin networks in household private transfers.
Hierarchy in Fijian society is determined by various ranks. Turner (1992, p. 291) highlights the roles of age, kin elite, and gender:
Hierarchy is defined here as the ranking of the elements of a whole (society) in relation to the whole. In this sense, the elements that are ranked are social categories or positions defined in terms of age, seniority of descent, and gender, and the whole in relation to which they are ranked is a social system grounded in ritual. Elder is superior to junior, chief to commoner, and male to female. But while age, rank, and gender differences entail relations of superiority/inferiority among persons, they also create interdependence. . . . These relations of inequality and interdependence (which do not preclude conflict) are expressed and reproduced in the practice of everyday life.
Community-group leaders who play major roles in development, social, and/or humanitarian activities are also likely to hold a high rank, as religious leaders do.
Disability may signify a low rank, as the disabled are often considered to be particularly disadvantaged in developing countries with limited public safety nets, though research on disability among the poor is scant (Yeo and Moore, 2003) . A unique feature of the Fijian data is that because households in each village are stratified by their kin group and elite status, direct measures of elite status are available. In standard household surveys, in contrast, elite status is often unobservable to researchers, and even if it is observable, there are too few elites to make a statistical analysis possible.
Two other features of the Fijian data are to be noted. First, distinct from many extant studies, transfer measures capture not only cash and inkind (e.g., food, handicrafts), but also labor time. This is crucial for group-based transfers, which often contain significant labor-time contributions to groups (e.g. communal work). Second, the paper focuses on domestic private transfers. This is simply because, distinct from extant studies in the Pacific region (Bertram, 1986; World Bank, 2006) , overseas remittances are almost nonexistent in my study area in Fiji's remote islands.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a description of the data and groups. Section 3 compares group-and network-based transfers, showing that their main difference is contributions to groups for their provision of local public goods. Section 4 explores the group-network connection in a descriptive manner. Section 5 discusses the econometric specification and hierarchy measures to test the hypothesized link of group-and network-based transfers. Estimation results are reported in Section 6.
The last section concludes.
Data and groups
In 2005 I conducted surveys among native Fijian households in Cakaudrove Province (Fiji is divided almost evenly between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians). The province is mainly located on Vanua Levu Island and Taveuni Island, the second-and third-largest islands in the country, which significantly lag behind the largest island, Viti Levu, where the state capital, two international airports, and most tourism businesses are situated. The province has 134 villages in 16 districts. In each district, I purposefully chose 43 villages to cover distinct environmental, economic, and social conditions. While the data represent neither the province nor the nation, the villages in the sample well capture various types of villages in Fiji's underdeveloped islands. In each village, households were stratified by the smallest kin group unit (defined shortly), as well as by the combination of leadership status (defined in Section 5) and major asset holdings (e.g., shops), and households were randomly sampled in each stratum (50% on average).
Overall, the survey covered 906 households.
Kin groups
Each native Fijian belongs to a lineage of the vanua-yavusa-mataqali-tokatoka hierarchy: Vanua consists of several yavusa; yavusa consists of several mataqali; and mataqali consists of several tokatoka (Ravuvu, 1983) . While vanua ranges over several villages, yavusa is mostly formed within the village; in another words, village formation is largely based on yavusa. The dominant symbol of Fijian culture is kava (a beverage infused from the root of a pepper plant, Piper methysticum), and kava rituals frequently involve exchanges of ceremonial goods, such as food, mats, and bark cloth (Turner, 1987) . Many ritual activities, such as funerals and weddings, are organized by mataqali and yavusa; vanua occasionally hold large traditional meetings. Kin groups also underlie household income-generating activities: Land is communally owned by mataqali (about 83% of the country's total land is communal), and customary rights for coastal fishing are held by vanua or several yavusa. The sample covers 20 vanua, 53 yavusa, 146 mataqali, and 234 tokatoka; an average village in the sample consists of 1.2 yavusa, 3.4 mataqali, and 5.6 tokatoka; and on average, each yavusa, mataqali, and tokatoka consists of 40, 14, and 8 households, respectively (see Table 1 ).
Community groups
Church, women's, school, and youth groups are four major types of community groups, and their distributions and memberships are distinct from each other. A church group formed for each church, which often covers more than one village, is available in all villages -3.3 church groups per village on average -and almost all households are members (church membership is largely based on heredity). Village church groups have strong ties with larger groups in the same sect. In contrast, if there are any non-religious community groups in a village at all, there is usually just one for each type. Membership in non-religious community groups is based on eligibility -gender, child schooling, and age -, and accordingly, fewer individuals belong to them than to a church. While membership is almost uniform among the eligible for school groups, such is not the case for women's and youth groups. The school group formed for each school can cover more than one village, while women's and youth groups are village based. The data lack information about the number of school groups in the village and the group-level membership of community groups; in particular, there is no information to indicate the particular church group to which each individual belongs.
Differences between group-and network-based transfers
My first argument is that group-based transfers are greater than network-based transfers, mainly because of household contributions to groups for their provision of local public goods, such as social activities and village upkeep. Because the Fijian data do not allow me to directly tell which contributions are actually used for public goods provision, I offer indirect, descriptive evidence supporting this conjecture.
Group-based transfers
Respondents were asked about the transfers -in the form of cash, inkind, and labor time, separately -they contributed to and received directly from each kin and community group discussed in the last section, as well as the village, in the past year.
These group-based transfer data are unbalanced in coverage between receipt and giving:
While the transfers that the household offers to groups contain all the resources the household contributes, those it receives from the group capture only partial benefits, excluding those of local public goods that the group provides. Directly measuring such benefits is very difficult, because they often include unobservable social and cultural benefits and can be heterogeneous across households.
This imbalance in the data is reflected in aggregate transfer patterns: While almost all households make contributions to some groups, 42% of households receive transfers from at least one group; the mean amount of transfers in any form given to all groups combined is more than six times those received from them (see panel A of Table 2 ). On the net, an average household makes cash-inkind contributions to groups by F$1,619 (=1,934-315), or 9% of its pre-transfer earned income (F$1 = US$.60). 1 An average household also contributes 47 man-days of labor time, which is equivalent to 5% of its labor-time endowment (the mean number of working adults is 3.1 and annual labor-time endowment per working adult is assumed to be 300 days), or 7% of its pre-transfer income (labor time is monetized based on men's daily wage in each village, the mean of which is F$16).
Since transfers made for within-group and across-group reallocations of resources in the village are roughly balanced, a major part of household contributions to groups should be used for their provision of local public goods. 2 This is supported by two pieces of evidence. First, the importance of labor-time transfers relative to cash-inkind is much greater in giving than in receipt. Second, the most common reason reported by respondents (in both receipt and giving) is ritual -a category containing significant public goods components. Table 3 shows proportions of reasons reported by respondents for each transfer (proportions are calculated using transfer amounts as weights, and if there is more than one reason for the same transfer, equal weights are assigned among them).
Disaggregate transfer patterns are also consistent with the significance of household contributions for public goods. While transfers received from kin groups and contributed to community groups are the most common and largest, the importance of labor-time transfers relative to cash-inkind is the greatest for the village (over 60%) (results not shown). When only members of each community group are considered, almost all make contributions, and church donations and school contributions are large.
Correspondingly, general contributions -another category containing a significant public goods components -to community groups as well as the village are as common as ritual;
in contrast, ritual dominates kin group transfers (almost two thirds in both receipt and giving) (results not shown). 3 Members receive almost no transfers from non-religious community groups, which presumably concentrate on the provision of public goods.
Network-based transfers
Respondents were also asked about each major transfer received from and given to other households in the past year. 4 These standard across-household transfer data are balanced in coverage between receipt and giving. While transfers received from other households are about twice as much as those received from groups, those given to other households are only about one fifth of those contributed to groups. The following patterns in contrast to group-based transfers are consistent with my conjecture that public-goods provision can be mainly distinguished between group-and network-based transfers.
Participation in cash-inkind transfers -both receipt and giving -are almost uniform; the mean amount of cash-inkind transfers is about four times that of monetized labor-time transfers; and an average household is a net recipient of cash-inkind transfers, but not labor-time transfers (panel B of Table 2 ). The most common reason is consumption/expenditure, a category that captures public goods components less than ritual and general contributions (Table 3) .
Connection between groups and networks
My second argument is that group-and network-based transfers are tightly linked with each other. This section offers descriptive evidence for the connection between groups and networks. Respondents were asked about the characteristics of households with which transfers were made. An average household exchanged transfers with 3.6 households in its network, approximately 80%, 70%, and 80% of whom are in the same village, the same tokatoka (closest kin), and the same church group, respectively. It is thus clear that physical and social proximities are major determinants of network formation (as found by Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007 in the Philippines). An important new finding is that social distance is determined not only by kinship, but also by religion.
Kin and religious connections are distinct from each other. On the one hand, with the hierarchical structure of kin groups in the village, how kinship matters in group-and network-based transfers depends on the closeness of kin relationships: The tokatoka network is more important than the tokatoka group, and the comparison is the opposite for mataqali, yavusa, and vanua. In particular, transfers received from tokatoka are almost negligible, and household contributions to tokatoka are half of transfers given to other households in the same tokatoka; at the same time, transfers received from other households in the same tokatoka are over two times those from all kin groups (Table 2 ).
It appears that the difference between the tokatoka group and the tokatoka network is blurred, as one third of households in the same tokatoka in the village are also part of the transfer network. 5 In contrast, households belonging to the same kin group higher than tokatoka are relatively uncommon in the network, and transfers exchanged directly with such kin groups are large (transfers contributed to all kin groups are twice as much as those given to other households in the same tokatoka).
On the other hand, there is no hierarchy among church groups in the village, and both church groups and church networks are important for giving and receipt, respectively: Household contributions to its church group are 1.5 times as much as transfers given to other households in the same church group; transfers received from other households in the same church group are 10 times those received directly from the church group.
In-and out-of-village networks
While group-based transfers are mostly made within the village, transfers exchanged with households in other villages or in another city, but not in another country, are more significant than suggested from relatively uncommon out-of-village networks.
First of all, while within-village transfers are much more common and larger than acrossvillage transfers, transfers (mostly cash-inkind) received from households outside the village are twice as common and four times larger than those given (they are actually similar to cash-inkind transfers received from all groups in the village); in contrast, within-village transfers are balanced between receipt and giving in both participation and amount (Table 2 ). This means that the net transfers received from other households at the aggregate level found above mostly come from out-of-village networks. An average household received 38% of transfers from 20% of households in its out-of-village network, i.e., the mean net across-village transfer received per partner household is about 2.5 times that of the within-village counterpart ((38%/20%)/(62%/80%)). There is no such difference in transfer amount per partner household between transfers made within and outside the same tokatoka or church group.
Out-of-village networks are mainly formed by close kin and religious relationships. Consistent with the comparison of within-and across-village transfers, an average household is a net recipient in its tokatoka network as well as in its out-of-kin network (consisting of households belonging to other vanua outside the village); in contrast, transfers in its mataqali/yavusa/vanua network are balanced between receipt and
giving. An average household is a net recipient both in and out of the church network.
Hierarchy and transfer linkage -econometric specification
I argue that network-based transfers counteract the hierarchy bias in group-based transfers. The last section showed that these two are linked through the physical and social connections of groups and networks and that transfers received through out-ofvillage networks are also considerable. I thus conjecture the following. First, the adjustment in network-based transfers to the hierarchy bias in group-based transfers is stronger outside the village than in the village, because out-of-village networks are less tightly connected with in-village groups than in-village networks are. Second, the adjustment to social ranks that are not formed by groups is stronger than those formed by kin and church groups, because groups and networks are socially connected by kinship and religion.
Identifying how group-based transfers biased by social ranks alter network-based transfers is very difficult, because these two are simultaneously determined. Instead I test the following hypotheses consistent with my conjectures.
Hypothesis 1: Network-and group-based transfers are affected by social ranks in opposite ways, and this is more strongly so in out-of-village networks than invillage networks.
Hypothesis 2: Network-based transfers are more strongly affected by social ranks that are not formed by groups than those formed by groups.
These hypotheses can be straightforwardly tested by estimating the effects of various social ranks on network-and group-based transfers in a comparable manner. Though adjustments in network-based transfers can occur in either network formation or transfer exchange in the network, or both, distinguishing between these two is beyond the scope of this paper. I first discuss the econometric specification and then detail social ranks.
Econometric specification
I employ the following standard transfer equation:
where y i is household i's net transfers received from other households, gross transfers received from groups, or gross transfers given to groups; X i is household social rank, as defined below; Z i is other household characteristics, such as shock, demographic factors, asset holdings, and public transfers; V is village dummies, which control for all village factors, such as location, village size, and inequality; and e i is an error term.
Two clarifications are needed. First, earned income is not controlled for in equation (1) . For net transfers received from other households, this is the only difference from many extant works in the literature. My goal is to identify the impact of social ranks, not that of earned income. To the extent that permanent income that can be correlated with social ranks is controlled for by demographic factors and asset holdings, omitted earned income does not cause bias. In contrast, earned income is endogenous as a determinant of household private transfers, because, in anticipation of private transfers, it may adjust earning efforts (i.e., decisions of earning and transfers are made simultaneously), and any unobservable factors that are correlated with earned income, such as skills, may also influence its transfer decisions. Controlling for income endogeneity is infeasible with these data, which lack valid instrumental variables (cf. Jensen, 2004; Juarez, 2009; Kazianga, 2006) . Second, the same transfer equation (1) is used for group-based transfers. My goal is not to dissect group mechanisms determining transfers, but to show how household social ranks alter transfer outcomes. For estimations comparable with network-based transfers, equation (1) can be used for group-based transfers with the following caveats.
Distinct from across-household transfers, transfers received from and given to groups need to be separately estimated, because their decisions are made by different agents and what they cover is unbalanced in the data. It is important to control for group factors, such as group size and inequality, because they can be correlated with social ranks formed in the group. When aggregate transfers made with multiple groups in the village are considered, however, it is not straightforward to construct aggregate group-level measures, though village dummies still control for the combination of group factors common in the village.
When participation in transfers is almost uniform, I employ Ordinary LeastSquares (OLS) to estimate equation (1); otherwise, I first estimate the determinants of participation using probit for the entire sample and then those of the amount among participants using OLS. This is a two-part, or hurdle, model commonly used in previous works on private and public transfers (e.g., Dercon and Krishnan, 2005; Jayne et al., 2002 ); a tobit model with a restrictive assumption that coefficients are the same between the participation and amount equations yields qualitatively similar results. An alternative sample selection model is infeasible with these data, which lack the identifying instruments required to credibly estimate the selection equation.
Hierarchy measures
I compare the following eight social ranks. Age, gender, and disability are ranks not formed by groups. They are measured by the age and gender of household head and the disability status of any household member (in the sample, the mean age is 51 years, 9% of households are headed by females, and 21% of households have at least one disabled member, according to respondents' subjective assessments).
Group-based ranks are categorized into two: kin and non-kin elite status. In Fiji, traditional permanent leadership positions determine individual and kin group status.
Highly ranked vanua chiefs and yavusa/mataqali chiefs assume traditional duties across villages and within the village, respectively (there is no takatoka chief). Yavusa and mataqali chiefs, some of whom are also a vanua chief, are available only in highly ranked yavusa and mataqali (chief's kin) (27% of households belong to chief's mataqali, see Table 1 ). Kin leaders, including chiefs, play a major role in the kin group's decisionmaking and negotiations among groups in the village (3%, 11%, and 18% of households have yavusa, mataqali, and tokatoka leaders, respectively). 6 Village chiefs are shared by some kin leaders and are not necessarily yavusa/mataqali chiefs. As such, kin elite status is measured by two dummies: chief's kin defined by mataqali and kin leaders of any group. Using chief's kin defined by tokatoka yields very similar results (recall that yavusa is a group very close to the village). My focus is on comparing hierarchy biases, not explaining each one. The theoretical prediction of the impact of each rank is ambiguous. Even if households with a low status (e.g., female head) are shown to receive greater private transfers, which motive operates it is unknown: It may be altruism helping the disadvantaged or a result of exchanges with more "services" offered by them (Cox, 1987) . Similarly, households with a high status (e.g., church leader) may appear to be favored because of the exchange motive, cultural norms that prioritize them, or a result of misappropriation; households with another high status (e.g., kin leader) may instead appear to be disfavored as a result of the exchange motive or reputation building.
Hierarchy and transfer linkage -estimation results
Estimation results of the eight social rank variables are reported in Table 4 participation in other group-based transfers is not uniform ( Table 2 ). The dummy for women's leader is excluded in the amount equations for transfers received from groups, because of the limited number of women's leaders among recipients (when women's leaders are combined with other non-kin leaders, almost the same results are obtained).
These are results for cash-inkind and monetized labor-time transfers combined; separate results for each are also discussed when they exhibit important distinct patterns. I discuss results for the group-network linkage hypothesized in the last section and the comparison of age, gender, and disability first, and then those of the across-group linkage.
Group-network linkage
Age, gender, and disability strongly affect group-based transfers. Households with an old head receive a larger amount from and contribute a smaller amount to groups, especially kin groups; female-headed households are more likely to be recipients of transfers from all three groups, are less likely to contribute to kin groups, and contribute a smaller amount to the village; and in contrast, households with a disabled member are less likely to participate in transfers with kin groups and the village (both receipt and giving), and they receive a smaller amount from the village. Hence, kin groups and the village treat females and the disabled in opposite ways in their reallocation of resources within the group. The disabled are strongly disfavored. While females are favored in all groups in the village, the elderly are favored in kin groups only weakly (the marginal effect of age is F$6.6 per year). Corresponding to these hierarchy biases, households with an old head and a disabled member rely more on their out-of-village networks. Observe that while households with an old head, a female head, and a disabled member receive greater net transfers from other households (column 9), when only within-village transfers are considered (column 10), the estimated coefficient of age becomes very small and loses statistical significance, that of gender does not change, and that of disability halves. That is, network-based transfers respond to age, gender, and disability outside the village, within the village, and both, respectively. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 1.
While kin leaders contribute more to kin groups (but are not large recipients) and church leaders are more likely to be recipients of transfers and receive a greater amount from community groups (but are not large donors), neither of them affects network-based transfers. Combined with the findings on age, gender, and disability, these results strongly support hypothesis 2. Qualitatively the same results about church leaders are obtained from estimating equation (1) for church groups separately: Compared to nonleaders, church leaders are 55% more likely to receive transfers and receive a greater amount by about F$260 -over six times the mean -from the church group (results not shown); with a lack of group-level membership information, however, no group factors are controlled for in this disaggregated analysis. Consistent with hypothesis 2, other nonkin leaders that are not strongly associated with networks do not affect any transfers.
A puzzling result of women's leaders is that while they do not influence community group transfers, they do receive smaller transfers (cash-inkind) from other households in the same village. The former result holds when women's groups are examined separately among group members (results not shown). These results require caution. They might be biased if women's leadership is correlated with unobservable skills and entrepreneurship, in particular, for handicraft making for both gifts and selling (another consistent result is obtained below). The nonsignificant result of group-based transfers may be the result of selection bias caused by endogenous participation in women's groups (participation is not uniform among the eligible as discussed above, and a sample selection model is infeasible for the same reason given above). Earlier findings on religious elite are unlikely to be contaminated by the potential endogeneity of women's leadership though, because dropping the latter variable hardly alters the results of the remaining variables.
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Across-group linkage
Elite kin and religious elite are the most influential across groups as follows. First, while kin group status (chief's kin) does not affect kin group transfers, households in chief's kin, but not kin leaders, are less likely to contribute (especially labor time) to the village. This may be because communal labor in the village is arranged mainly among kin groups. Next, while households of chief's kin receive a large amount from church groups, church leaders receive a smaller amount (cash-inkind) from and contribute a larger amount to kin groups; in contrast, church leaders are more likely to receive transfers from the village. These patterns may be because church membership relatively matches kinship in the village (proving this is infeasible with a lack of group-level membership data). Lastly, women's leaders contribute more labor time to the village.
This may be because women's group members -both leaders and non-leaders -play a significant role in village activities (e.g., handicrafts, festive meals).
Conclusion
Using original household survey data gathered in rural Fiji, this paper provided evidence that (1) group-based transfers -both cash-inkind and labor time -are much greater than network-based transfers, mainly because of significant contributions to groups for their provision of local public goods, and (2) access to information and emphasize consensual decision-making; Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) offer a theory of elite capture. Policymakers need to pay attention to social ranks locally formed not only by kinship, but also by religion. Third, as the private redistributive mechanism for the disabled is very weak, strong public support for and more research on disability among the poor are greatly needed.
Almost all households employ traditional farming practices, using no mechanized equipment or animal traction and limited purchased inputs to produce taro, cassava, coconut, and kava plants. Most households engage in subsistence fishing, using lines and hooks, simple spear guns, or rudimentary nets, and more commercially oriented fishermen use boats with engines, along with more valuable nets. Farming and fishing, respectively, count for 62% and 12% of household earned income. One third of households receive public transfers -mostly pensions -and the mean amount is only 2.5% of earned income. 
